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Quick Feedback Print this Section E-mail to a Friend[Response by Eric P. Chiang, May 2009]
“According to ITU surveys, interconnection-related issues are ranked by many countries as the single most important problem in the development of a competitive marketplace for telecommunications services…” (Intven et al. 2000)
This statement exemplifies the importance of the role that telecommunications regulators have on interconnection. Interconnection, which is the linking of telecommunications networks so that customers of one network can communicate with customers of another network, is important for several reasons, including:
For example in some countries, mobile carriers sometimes become ensnarled in interconnection disputes and delink their networks. Many customers in these countries find it necessary to have a SIM card for each mobile operator to ensure that they can reach customers on all networks during the times of these interconnection disputes. This raises costs for customers and decreases the rate of call completion, which costs customers time.
Furthermore, as global commerce continues to become more integrated and paperless, efficient interconnection is important to enable activities such as electronic banking, e-commerce, mobile roaming, and e-mail. Efficient interconnection also facilitates the implementation of new technologies as countries reap value from global connectivity and strive for cost-saving technologies. Although the term interconnection and the term access are often used interchangeably, many industry experts prefer to draw distinctions between the two. Intven et al. (2000) describes the distinction as follows:
A general overview of interconnection issues can be found in Module 2 of the ICT Regulation Toolkit (2007), a new Internet-based resource available at: http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/index.html
Regulatory approach to developing interconnection: Regulation is vital in the development of interconnection agreements, especially in countries new to competition within its telecommunications sector. Incumbent operators face gains and losses from interconnection:
Gain to incumbents:
Loss to incumbents:
Because incumbents often perceive that the value of potential losses outweighs the gains, incumbents often engage in strategies to hinder interconnection and protect their markets; for example, by delaying implementation of the interconnection agreement or by charging excessive fees to entrants. As a result, intervention or guidance by regulatory bodies is seen as a necessity in promoting a healthy competitive environment.
The key roles of the regulator include determining appropriate prices, which generally involve identifying appropriate costs so that prices are cost based, and resolving disputes.1 Inherent in these roles is the regulatory challenge of removing cross subsidies. Jamison (1998) points to two main issues relating cross subsidies with interconnection and competition. The first issue deals with how to fund universal service obligations, which in some countries have been funded through usage prices. (Some studies challenge the notion that such monies were actually used to promote network expansion and subscription.) The second issue deals with how much price flexibility should be permitted in markets subject to competition. The role of cross subsidies appears throughout the discussion on interconnection, from its role in allocating joint costs to the need for rate rebalancing in order to create a fair competitive market.2
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.
in Infrastructure Regulation and Market Reform: Principles and Practice, edited by Margaret Arblaster and Mark Jamison. Canberra, Australia: ACCC and PURC, 1998, pp. 113-129.