Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulation
2. Market Structure and Competition >> References >> C. Competition for the Market >>

1. General concepts and efficiency impacts

Core References

  • Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, Chapter 20. Baldwin, Robert, and Martin Cave

    Examines both commercial and government franchising. Discusses methods of allocating franchises, such as auctions, and problems with franchises. Problems include specifying the franchised service, ensuring efficient competition for the market, enforcement, and terminating contracts.

  • Franchising and Privatization PDF Available Note no. 40 in Public Policy for the Private Sector. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 1995. Dnes, Antony W.

    Explains that franchise bidding is one way of having competition for the market when the market exhibits natural monopoly characteristics. Holds that the scheme can provide low prices for customers if the bid is for retail prices that will be charged.

  • Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing It Right Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2004, Chapters 2 and 7, Chapters 1-2. Guasch, J. Luis

    Provides an overview of concessions, including how they work, benefits, drawbacks, and experiences.

  • Managing the Regulatory Process: Design, Concepts, Issues, and the Latin America and Caribbean Story Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 1999, Chapters 8-9. Guasch, J. Luis, and Pablo Spiller

    Examines franchising and concessions. Examines cases in Argentina, Mexico, and Chile. Describes how to design concession arrangements.

  • Concessions – The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector Monopolies. PDF Available Note no. 59 in Public Policy for the Private Sector. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 1995. Guislain, Pierre, and Michel Kerf

    States that concession-type arrangements can be used for privatizing sectors with monopoly characteristics. Under this approach, the government grants the private sector the right to provide the utility service, but retains some control through a concession contract or license. The continuum of private participation options ranges from short-term supply and service contracts to concessions to full privatization.

Sectoral References

TRANSPORTATION
WATER
  • Water Sector Contracts in Mexico City, Mexico in Thirsting for Efficiency: The Economics and Politics of Urban Water System Reform, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002, pp. 139-187. Haggarty, Luke, Penelope Brook, and Ana Maria Zuluaga

    Describes water service contracts in Mexico. Illustrates the use of multiple operators to provide competitive pressure. Considers the motivations for the water sector reforms, the policy decisions, and policy changes.

  • Improving Water Services through Competition PDF Available Note no. 164 in Public Policy for the Private Sector. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, December 1998. Webb, M., and Ehrhardt, D.

    States that many major water sector reforms in recent years have used competition for the market as an efficient way of introducing private sector participation, and the approach has delivered benefits to consumers. Holds that competition forces the bidders to reveal the minimum cost of providing water and sanitation, allowing efficiency gains to be realized and passed on to consumers. Competition for the market can be combined with other forms of competition. Requiring the concessionaire to contract out many services can keep up the pressure for efficiency during long-term contracts. And comparative competition between the concessionaire and other utilities can boost performance.

Other References

  • Privatization: An Economic Analysis Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988, Chapter 3. Vickers, John, and George Yarrow

    Describes the effects of competition.

Key Words

Competition for the market, Monopoly, Franchise